The disarray of Japan's domestic politics has resulted in added reluctance on both the U.S. and Japanese sides to undertake serious discussions on long-term strategic objectives of the alliance. The second issue is whether the DPJ will return to closer U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on regional security issues, which is laid out by the LDP governments. Revisions of the LDP policies that the Hatoyama government undertook since late 2009 upset the United States. On the other hand, the declining voter support for the Hatoyama government seemed mostly attributable to domestic factors, including his continued reliance on Ichiro Ozawa (whose secretary was arrested for misreporting the campaign contributions) and Hatoyama's own mishandling of campaign contributions from his mother. Although Kan has reemphasized U.S.-Japan security cooperation, DPJ foreign policy of being more selective about security cooperation with the United States does not seem to be hurting the party's popularity.
The post-Cold War evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance was first and foremost represented by the gradual enlargement of the SDF missions beyond territorial defense of Japan under the LDP governments. Starting with SDF participation in UN PKO in Cambodia (1993-94) , SDF roles overseas after the simultaneous terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, expanded to include support to the multilateral maritime patrol operation in the Indian Ocean (2001-9) and the reconstruction and logistics support in Iraq (2003-8) in a coalition framework.
While the SDF dispatches to the remote postconflict regions attracted media attentions, East Asia-Japan's immediate neighborhood-has experienced several upswings of tensions. On the one hand, the rise of China is steadily altering the regional power balance over a long term. On the other hand, tensions across the Taiwan Strait and over the Korean Peninsula fluctuated since the end of the Cold War. In both cases, domestic politics of each country played important roles in the rise and fall of tensions that cannot be explained solely in terms of international systemic factors. Most importantly, however, rise of tensions in the region has provided a strong impetus for Japan to revise its security role in the region. Through two key legislations (Regional Contingency Law, 1998; Armed Attack Contingency Law, 2004) , Japan has more clearly spelled out the expanded scope of SDF activities to be taken bilaterally in support of the U.S. troops.
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The clearer articulation of the SDF roles near abroad and its cooperation with the U.S. forces has undoubtedly invited various responses from Japan's regional neighbors. The United States sees a contingency over the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Strait as the test of the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan's regional neighbors see that Japan's ban on collective defense has been reinterpreted in order to allow closer security cooperation with the United States. To some, Japan's crossing of the Rubicon-overcoming the taboo against collective defense 2 -is an encouraging sign. To others, it is a warning sign that the U.S.-Japan alliance is losing its less spoken aspect of containing possible reemergence of Japan's militarism-the argument that the alliance is no longer serving as the "cork in the bottle."
3 Most of Japan's neighbors do not neatly fit into either or the other of the two camps, and instead have gone through internal debates on this question.
